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Abstract 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission adopted the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China on 7 January, 2002. It allows the 
implementation of a cumulative voting system in the election of a company's board of 
directors for listed companies. Due to its permissive nature, controlling shareholders 
dominate decisions on the implementation or abolition of cumulative voting in the election 
of the board of directors. We argue that permissive cumulative voting in China plays a 
signaling role in indicating good corporate governance and operating performance of a firm. 
We discover positive market responses in terms of cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to 
the cumulative voting announcement at the firm level. Furthermore, the market responds 
more positively for firms with more active minority shareholder groups, a higher ratio of 
independent directors in the board of directors, and a stronger operating profit to asset ratio 
(OP/A). By comparing top executives' pay-performance sensitivities, we discover that 
cumulative voting firms have better corporate governance, whether before or after 
cumulative voting implementation, compared with straight voting firms. Moreover, we 
discover that cumulative voting is not associated with stronger improvement on corporate 
governance and firm value in the long-term compared with straight voting firms. However, 
the implementation of cumulative voting is associated with improved operating 
performance in the long-term as an increase of return on equity (ROE); in addition, the 
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1. Introduction 
The separation of management and ownership has created various agency problems and 
conflicts between managers and firms' shareholders. Another conflict in firms is between 
the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders experiencing "tunneling." It refers to 
the transferring out of company resources to its controlling shareholders through self-
dealing transactions. Prior studies on corporate governance mechanism have investigated 
some aspects related to the two conflicts. Winter (1977), Fama (1980), and Weisbach (1988) 
have shown that directors are effective monitors of management performance and that 
managerial collusion may be reduced by the presence of independent outside directors. 
Johnson et al. (2000) finds that tunneling is very common, not only in emerging countries 
but also in developed countries. 
Facing the long-lasting conflicts between managers and shareholders, as well as the 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, some governments adopt cumulative 
voting in the election of a company's board of directors. It enhances the voting power of 
minority shareholders. Bebchuk (2005) has proposed that cumulative voting increases the 
controlling power of minority shareholders over corporate decisions and combats 
widespread managerial agency problems. Opponents such as Bainbridge (2006) argue that 
cumulative voting reduces shareholder value because minority shareholders lack either the 
requisite knowledge or expertise to arrive at effective value-reducing decisions. 
China founded stock exchanges in the early 1990s to raise capital and improve the 
operating performance of state-owned enterprises. However, poor practices in governance 
were rampant. The Chinese government thus strengthened laws to protect shareholder 
interests and intensified the enforcement of such laws and regulations. On 7 January, 2002, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission adopted the Code of Corporate Governance 
for Listed Companies in China. It was the first regulation on cumulative voting in the 
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election of directors and supervisors of listed companies in China in the national level. 
Under the code, controlling shareholders hold absolute power in determining whether or not 
to adopt cumulative voting in the election of their company's board of directors. 
In this paper, we estimate the short-term market reactions to the announcement of the 
implementation of cumulative voting in the election of board of directors by event study. 
We also analyze the rationale driving controlling shareholders to implement cumulative 
voting in the election of aboard of directors. At firm level, we study how cumulative voting 
announcement signals good corporate governance mechanism and firm operating 
performance, both of which contribute to positive market reaction. Meanwhile, we 
determine how the implementation of cumulative voting in the election of board of directors 
is associated with the change of corporate governance mechanism, operating performance, 
and firm value in the long-term. 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we document the 
history and development of cumulative voting in the election of a company's board of 
director in China's stock market. Second, prior studies only measured the short-term market 
responses to cumulative voting amendment proposal announcement at the firm level in the 
U.S. market. We estimate the short-term market responses at the firm level in China to be 
positive to cumulative voting announcement; this is something that has not been previously 
studied in the context of the China market. Third, apart from investigating the short-term 
market responses to the cumulative voting announcement, we estimate the respective long-
term relationships between cumulative voting in the election of a company's board of 
directors and the change of corporate governance, operating performance, and firm value at 
the firm level. We contribute to a fuller understanding of both short-term and long-term 
market responses to cumulative voting and how these are associated with the change of 
Chinese firms' corporate governance, operating performance, and firm value. This is 
essential in the transition of the China stock market from an emerging market 
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to a mature market. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines and elaborates the basic 
idea of cumulative voting. Section 3 reviews the literature on cumulative voting and 
presents measures to increase protection of minority shareholders. Section 4 documents the 
history and development of cumulative voting around the world and in China's stock 
market. Our major arguments are developed in Section 5. The methodology and data are 
introduced in Sections 6 and 7. Section 8 reports the empirical findings, while we give our 
conclusions in section 9. 
2. Definition and basic idea of Cumulative Voting 
Cumulative voting is a mechanism relative to straight voting. Under straight voting, 
each shareholder is entitled to cast votes equal to the number of shares held for each director 
position. Therefore, if a group controls the dominating percentage of shares, the group can 
elect all favored candidates for each position of the entire board of directors. Under 
cumulative voting, each shareholder is entitled to cast votes equal to the number of shares 
held, multiplied by the number of directors to be elected in the shareholders' meeting. 
Under extreme circumstances, the shareholder can cast all of his/her votes for just a single 
candidate. Therefore, contrary to straight voting, cumulative voting makes it possible for a 
minority group of shareholders to elect one or more board members even if a majority 
opposes their election. 
Cumulative voting can be classified into mandatory cumulative voting and permissive 
cumulative voting. The main difference between permissive cumulative voting and 
mandatory cumulative voting is that, under permissive cumulative voting, the execution of 
cumulative voting depends on regulations on articles of association on the election of 
directors. This means the firm has to amend the regulations on article of association to 
regulate cumulative voting in the election of a company's board of directors before 
implementation, where amendment of regulation on article of association is usually subject 
9 
to straight voting. On the other hand, regulations on articles of association play no role 
under mandatory cumulative voting. It is mandatory in nature. 
Let "a" be the number of votes held by the largest shareholder, which is the number of 
shares of stock multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. Let "b" be the number of 
votes held by the minority shareholders, which is the number of shares multiplied by the 
number of directors to be elected. Let "n" be the number of directors to be elected. The 
sufficient condition for minority shareholders to elect 1 director under cumulative voting 
can be represented by the following: 
n 
The expected number of votes to elect one director "v" under cumulative voting is 
represented by: 
n 
We elaborate on the mechanism of cumulative voting in the election of a company's 
board of directors by the following numerical example. Assume a company has 2 
shareholders. The largest shareholder holds 60 shares while the minor shareholder holds 40 
shares. During the election, 4 directors are to be elected and each shareholder can nominate 
4 candidates. Therefore, in this election, the largest shareholder has 60X4=240 votes, while 
the minority shareholder has 40X4=160 votes. They can distribute their votes freely 
according to their own strategies. However, theoretically speaking, the expected number of 
votes required to elect 1 director is (240+160)/4=100. Hence, it is impossible for the major 
shareholders to elect all favored candidates for all the available director positions. 
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3. Literature Review 
Research on the use of cumulative voting in electing the board of directors of listed firms 
in the field of corporate governance is very limited. The first significant paper is contributed 
by William (1955) who discussed that cumulative voting theoretically and suggested that it 
is basically fair because minority representation under cumulative voting does not break the 
majority rule; in addition, minority groups have the potential power to influence directors 
by having representation on the board. Dodd and Warner (1983)，examining a sample of 
firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on board of directors, have discovered that 
dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats. However, some 
minority shareholders obtain seats through cumulative voting in over half of the sample 
contests. This suggests the effectiveness of cumulative voting in electing minority 
shareholder representatives into the board. Bhagat and Brickley (1984) have studied NYSE-
listed firms from 1962 to 1984. Using event study method, they learned that a proposal 
enhancing the effect of cumulative voting does not affect firms' values. However, an 
amendment proposal reducing the impact of cumulative voting does not provide symmetric 
result and appears to be accompanied by negative stock return. The paper is result-driven 
although Bhagat and Brickley do not explain the rationale behind the empirical results. 
The implementation of cumulative voting in the election of a company's board of 
directors is a regulatory reform meant to increase minority shareholders' impact on 
corporate decision that, in turn, protects the interests of these minority shareholders. There 
are two streams of research with regards to analyzing the economic consequences of such 
regulatory changes in minority shareholders' control over corporate decisions. The first 
stream does natural experiment using the passage of state anti-takeover legislations in the 
U.S. They study how the change in the balance of power between management and minority 
shareholders affects shareholder value, corporate investments, capital structure, and 
employee compensation. For example, Garvey and Hanka (1999) and Bertrand and 
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Mullainathan (2003) have discovered that state anti-takeover legislations increase 
managerial entrenchment and reduce shareholder value. 
The second stream studies the relationship between country-level investor protections, 
shareholder value, and financial market development. Wurgler (2000) has suggested that 
strong country-level investor protections are associated with improved capital allocation. La 
Porta et al. (1997) has suggested that country-level investor protections are associated with 
higher shareholder value and faster financial market development. 
4. History and Development 
4.1. Around the world 
Cumulative voting first appeared in Great Britain and soon developed in the U.S. in the 
late 19th century. It grew rapidly in the U.S. due to the frequent cheating on minority 
shareholders by major shareholders within railway companies in Illinois. To protect 
minority shareholders, the Illinois state constitution gave the right of cumulative voting to 
minority shareholders of firms in 1870. Afterwards, cumulative voting was further 
developed. Until 1955, 20 states in the U.S. required mandatory cumulative voting by state 
law. However, since the 1950s, cumulative voting experienced a steady decline. In 1984, 
cumulative voting was only mandatory in 18 states; this number further dwindled to 6 in 
1992. In 2003，only 9.2% of the Standard & Poor's Super 1500 implemented cumulative 
voting (Maassen and Brown, 2006). That many states abandoned mandatory cumulative 
voting in the 1950s could be attributed to the way in which cumulative voting facilitated 
hostile takeovers that were popular during the time. Nowadays, investment funds have 
become much more substantial, and shareholders that usually have long term investment 
goals are not likely to take over a corporation. 
Looking at the cumulative voting history in the Asian region, Japan adopted the 
company law in 1974. This law states that the shareholders can require the board to use 
cumulative voting when the purpose of the general meeting is for electing two or more 
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directors. It is permissive cumulative voting in nature. South Korea amended the company 
law in 1998 to allow cumulative voting. The amendment was similar to that of Japan. It is 
also permissive cumulative voting in nature. Meanwhile, in 1966, Taiwan implemented 
mandatory cumulative voting; however, it shifted to permissive cumulative voting in 2001. 
Hong Kong allows cumulative voting in election of board of director and it is permissive in 
nature. We conclude that permissive cumulative voting is more popular around the world 
compared with mandatory cumulative voting in the election of a company's board of 
directors. 
4.2. Cumulative voting in listed companies in China 
China's stock market was founded in 1990. However, the company law was not adopted 
until 1993 and, at that time, it did not regulate the implementation of cumulative voting in 
listed companies in national level. Nevertheless, on the regional level, some regional 
company legislations regulated cumulative voting in the election of directors and 
supervisors in the 1990s and they were all permissive in nature. Some examples include the 
adoption of the Regulation of the Hainan Special Economic Zone on Limited Liability 
Company Article 99 in 1992 and the adoption of the Regulation of the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone on Limited Liability Company Article 97 in 1993. They regulated 
permissive cumulative voting in the election of the board of directors and supervisors for 
companies incorporated in the mentioned regions. Therefore, although the implementation 
of cumulative voting in the election of directors and supervisors within listed companies 
was very uncommon in China in the 1990s, there were still examples of companies 
implementing this system. 
On 7 January, 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission adopted the Code of 
Corporate Governance for listed companies in China. It was the first regulation on 
cumulative voting in electing directors and supervisors of listed companies in China in the 
national level. Article 31 of the code states that: 
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"The election of directors shall folly reflect the opinions of minority shareholders. 
A Cumulative Voting System shall be earnestly advanced in shareholders' meetings 
for the election of directors. Listed companies that are more than 30% owned by 
controlling shareholders shall adopt a Cumulative Voting System，and the 
companies that do adopt such a system shall stipulate the implementation rules for 
such Cumulative Voting System in their articles of association" 
Since the implementation of cumulative voting system, shareholders had to follow the 
company's articles of association. Under the code, permissive cumulative voting was used 
in all listed companies to avoid adopting cumulative voting in the election of directors. This 
was done by amending the company's article of association related to the election of board 
of directors, which only previously required straight voting. 
A more detailed regulation of cumulative voting appeared in 2005. On 27 October, 2005, 
the PRC government adopted the new company law, which mainly listed the responsibilities 
of company shareholders. Article 106 states that 
"When the shareholders' meeting elects directors or supervisors, it may, according 
to the Articles of association or resolution of the shareholders' meeting, adopt a 
Cumulative Voting system. The term "Cumulative Voting system," as mentioned in 
this Law refers to a system of voting by shareholders for the election of directors or 
supervisors at a session of the shareholders' meeting in which the shareholder can 
multiply his voting rights by the number of candidates and vote them all for one 
candidate for director or supervisor." 
Therefore, subject to the more detailed law on cumulative voting in 2005, the 
implementation of the cumulative voting system in the election of directors or supervisors 
of a listed company in China is still permissive in nature. The cumulative voting in the 
election of board of directors is subjected to the articles of association or resolution of the 
shareholders' meeting. Therefore, a listed company in China can implement cumulative 
voting only when the article of association has relevant regulations. Otherwise, straight 
voting is implemented. 
The system is tricky in the sense that the amendment of the articles of association or 
resolution of the shareholders' meeting is subject to straight voting but not cumulative 
voting. Given that the controlling shareholder dominates any decision under straight voting, 
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the largest shareholder dominates the rights and final decision on the amendment of articles 
of association or resolution of the annual shareholders' meeting. Therefore, we conclude 
that in China's stock market, the largest shareholder has the absolute right and power to 
decide whether or not to carry out or abolish cumulative voting in the election of board of 
directors of listed companies. 
5. Hypothesis 
5.1. Nature of cumulative voting 
China's stock market was officially bom in late 1990. In fewer than 15 years, it has 
grown to become the eighth largest in the world. According to Pistor and Xu (2005), based 
on the number of listed firms, market capitalization, liquidity and flind-raising capability, 
the Chinese stock market has out-performed the markets in most transition economies. 
Although the stock market in China is still young, it has already generated many 
stakeholders. Interest groups, through various channels, have consistently shifted a great 
amount of bank lending into the stock market, leading to the emergence Of corporate 
governance as a prominent issue. Many parties, including regulators, market participants 
and academics, have been working very hard to improve Chinese firms' corporate 
governance. In the aspect of regulation effect, one of the important measures is regulating 
cumulative voting in the election of board of directors. On 7 January, 2002，the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission adopted the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in China. It regulated the implementation of cumulative voting subject to the 
articles of association or resolution of the shareholders' meeting. This means that a listed 
company in China implements cumulative voting only when the company's articles of 
association have relevant regulations; otherwise, straight voting is implemented. The 
amendment of the articles of association or resolution of the shareholders' meeting is subject 
to straight voting. Given that the largest shareholder dominates under straight voting, it thus 
dominates the amendment of articles of association or resolution of the shareholders' 
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meeting. Therefore, the largest shareholder decides whether or not to carry out or abolish 
cumulative voting. We have to analyze the costs and benefits to controlling shareholder 
when allowing the implementation of cumulative voting in order to study the motivations 
for controlling shareholder to implement cumulative voting in the election of board of 
directors. 
In nature, permissive cumulative voting allows the controlling shareholder to 
voluntarily increase outside supervision on himself and the firm. When the controlling 
shareholder allows the implementation of cumulative voting, it is tantamount to increasing 
minority shareholders' control over corporate decisions by lowering controlling 
shareholder's control power. Representatives of minority shareholders will thus acquire 
greater opportunities to be elected as board of directors. This lower hurdle motivates 
minority shareholders to play a stronger monitor role, not only in management but also in 
controlling shareholders, especially because the cost of affecting the firm decisions is 
lowered. However, according to Bhagat and Brickley (1984), when a minority shareholder 
representative joins the board, it could lead to dissent that, in turn, can outweigh benefits 
(e.g., lowering manager-shareholder agency cost) that reduce firm value. We claim that the 
cost of dissent would be even larger for firms suffering from poor corporate governance 
mechanism and bad operating performance. Furthermore, although a good director should 
not focus on the interests of any special group, shareholders with narrow and selfish 
interests could abuse cumulative voting. Porter (1992) has claimed that minority 
shareholders often have a short-term focus inducing management to make myopic decisions 
that hurt long-term shareholder value. This is one of the benefits motivating minority 
shareholders to monitor firm and controlling shareholders. 
If the controlling shareholder is engaged in tunneling, the implementation of cumulative 
voting makes tunneling more difficult or even impossible, because the controlling 
shareholder faces stronger supervision from representatives of minority shareholders. This 
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hurts the controlling shareholder but benefits the minority shareholders and firm value. 
Therefore, we conclude that controlling shareholder will not allow cumulative voting due to 
the cost consideration if tunneling is present. 
We argue that the announcement of cumulative voting is a signal of good corporate 
governance and operating performance. It is also a signal that the controlling shareholder 
does not engage in tunneling. Therefore, the announcement is a positive signal to the market 
that leads to increased firm value. We argue the increase in firm value is the major benefit 
to controlling shareholder for allowing cumulative voting. Cumulative voting signals to the 
market that the firm has good corporate governance and operating performance, it increases 
the firm value. This is the major motivation for controlling shareholder to allow cumulative 
voting. Studies have shown that good corporate governance increases the firm's market 
valuation by allowing cumulative voting. McKinsey (2002) conducted a series of surveys 
with both institutional and private equity investors. The evidence indicated that 80% of 
these investors were willing to pay a premium to well-governed firms. Black (2001), Black 
et al. (2002), Gompers et al. (2002, 2003), and Joh (2003) all found a positive correlation 
between performance measures and governance level. We believe that the announcement 
indicates good corporate governance and operating performance as well as the fact that the 
shareholder does not engage in tunneling. Thus, it brings premium to firm's market value. 
If the firm's controlling shareholder allows cumulative voting, it signals to the market 
that the benefit (increase in firm value due to market realization of good corporate 
governance and operating performance) is greater than the costs (dissent within the board 
and tunneling gain) under the controlling shareholder's estimation. This leads to the first 
general hypothesis stated as: 
HI: The market responds positively to firms that announce the implementation of 
cumulative voting in the election of the board of directors. 
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It is unlikely that the controlling shareholders would abolish it once it has announced the 
implementation of cumulative voting, because this signals worsening corporate governance 
and operating performance as well as hints at the existence of tunneling, thereby reducing 
firm value. According to Del Guercio et al. (2008), the controlling shareholder wants to 
avoid public embarrassment and the associated damage to their individual reputations. 
Controlling shareholders hold confidential, superior and insider information; thus, we 
believe that only when the controlling shareholder foresees that the firm will continue with 
current good corporate governance and operating performance, as well as non-engagement 
in tunneling will cumulative voting be implemented to realize the premium of firm value. 
Therefore, in the long run, we believe that the degree of improvement on corporate 
governance, operating performance, and market firm value of cumulative firms is not worse 
than that of firms without cumulative voting. This leads us to our second general hypothesis: 
H2: In the long run, the degree of improvement on corporate governance, operating 
performance, and market firm value for firms that implement cumulative voting in election 
of board of directors is not worse than that of firms without cumulative voting. 
5.2 Relationship of corporate governance mechanism and tunneling in signaling the 
effect of cumulative voting 
By understanding corporate governance mechanism and tunneling framework of listed 
companies in China, we analyze how cumulative voting can signal good corporate 
governance, good operating performance and the absence of tunneling to the market, 
thereby leading to increased firm value. The theoretical backgrounds also helped in the 
creation of variables for capturing corporate governance mechanism, operating performance, 
and tunneling variables in the methodology section. 
5.2.1. Ownership characteristics 
When the controlling shareholder holds relatively fewer stakes compared with other 
shareholders, there is an incentive to transfer resources out of listed companies to benefit 
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him/her but hurt the other shareholders. This is called tunneling. Several corporate scandals 
in China involved large shareholders misusing firm resources. Tunneling is inefficient to the 
whole group of shareholders. According to Cheung et al. (2005)，tunneling normally takes 
the form of "connected transactions" in China. They found evidence that controlling 
shareholders extracted value from the listed firms. Rights issuing of shares and placing 
equity are methods to initiate tunneling, according to Lee and Xiao (2004) who found that 
China firms, especially state-dominant firms, pay cash dividends soon after the offering of 
rights. For firms holding several non-tradeable shares, giving up subscription rights and 
using receipts from rights offerings to pay cash dividends are equivalent to selling a portion 
of the non-tradeable shares by the majority shareholders to the minority shareholders. 
Technically speaking, we argue that the two operations of dividend payouts are not 
tunneling as all shareholders get dividends. However, it is clear that the major motivation 
for controlling shareholders is the chance to capture short-term benefits without considering 
long-term firm development. Therefore, we consider these two operations as factors that 
worsen corporate governance. 
In a discussion on dividends, Jensen (1986) stated that agency problems arise when free 
cash flow is substantial and that dividend helps lower free cash flow. La Porta et al. (2000) 
found that firms in countries providing better protection for the minority shareholders pay 
higher dividends. This makes us conclude dividend payout is a signal of good corporate 
governance. However, considering that a dividend is a tool through which the controlling 
shareholder can capture short-term benefits without considering long-term firm 
development, we believe dividend payout is a more complicated issue in China. Komai and 
Matits (1984) and Farell (1991) have discovered that Chinese data reveal a substantial and 
growing link between profit and retained earnings. Yuan (2001) found that China's unique 
enterprise system and market environment have tremendous effect on the dividend policy of 
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its listed companies. In this system, larger shareholders have the incentive to transfer cash 
from the listed companies to themselves. 
Therefore, we believe that when the controlling shareholder has relatively fewer stakes, if 
the controlling shareholder is engaging in or plan to engage in tunneling, cumulative voting 
is avoided as this will raise supervision and thus a higher cost of dissent on the board of 
director to carry out tunneling. On the other hand, if the controlling shareholder is not 
engaged in or does not plan to engage in tunneling, there is no incentive for substantial 
shareholders to improve corporate governance mechanism due to the free-rider problem. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), if ownership is initially dispersed, the emergence 
of a large shareholder mitigates the free-rider problem among shareholders attempting to 
monitor the managers. 
When ownership concentration approaches a relatively high level, the incentive of 
tunneling is removed. Furthermore, the free-rider problem of the controlling shareholder is 
mitigated. Given that firm value is in line with the controlling shareholder value, we believe 
that under the preconditions of concentrated ownership, good corporate governance and 
good operating performance, cumulative voting in the election of board of directors would 
be implemented to raise firm value. However, if the firm has poor corporate governance, 
cumulative voting is still avoided due to the high cost of dissent in the board even if the 
controlling shareholder holds relatively high level of stakes. 
5.2.2. Activeness of minority shareholders 
Cumulative voting only lowers the hurdle vote for electing a director, and the 
participation and cooperation of the minority shareholders are still required to successfully 
elect their favored representative that, in turn, helps in monitoring the firm and controlling 
shareholder. Therefore, it is obvious that the more active the minority shareholders are in 
participating in firm activities, the more interested they would be in monitoring the firm and 
controlling shareholder. Furthermore, it is likely that cumulative voting mechanism will 
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lead to the election of minority shareholders' favored representatives. Therefore, the 
positive signal of having good corporate governance and operating performance would be 
stronger for firms with more active minority shareholders. 
There is another stream of theories on the role of activeness of minority shareholders on 
corporate governance. According to Bainbridge (2006), minority shareholders lack the 
requisite knowledge and expertise to make effective decisions or have reduced incentives to 
make long-term value decisions but increased incentives to make short-term value decisions. 
However, Zhao and Brehm (2009) have argued there is discordance between the board of 
directors and minority shareholders. One extreme example is the "just vote no" campaign 
initiated by some shareholder activists in the 1990s in the U.S. market. The idea is because 
it is not cost-efficient to campaign issue-oriented shareholder proposals, some minority 
shareholders should withhold votes towards a director's election to express dissatisfaction 
with management performance or the firm's corporate governance structure. In this case, 
cumulative voting is an effective measure to ease this tension since it lowers the cost and 
raises the benefit for minority shareholders to monitor the firm and controlling shareholders. 
Therefore, we believe that cumulative voting creates firm value, because it eases the tension 
between the board of directors and minority shareholders. The more active the minority 
shareholders are, the higher the premium on the firm value in the implementation of 
cumulative voting. 
5.2.3. Legal framework 
The legal framework and legal foundation of an economy play an important role in 
monitoring manager behaviors. These have been documented by a series of studies 
conducted by La Porta et al. (1997，1998, 1999，2002). Due to the capital account 
regulations in China, some listed companies do dual listings as H shares and B shares in 
Hong Kong and Shanghai, respectively. They must, however, adopt international 
accounting standards. In addition, both markets have stricter legal framework on monitoring 
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manager behaviors. Therefore, the stricter supervision associated with listing in the H or B 
share market assures good corporate governance. However, listing in the H or B share 
market is not that easy to accomplish for Chinese enterprises since it is regulated by the 
CSRC. We have elaborated that if a firm has good corporate governance and operating 
performance and is not engaged in tunneling, cumulative voting is announced in order to 
raise firm value. If they are not listing in the H or B markets, we believe the implementation 
of cumulative voting gives a stronger positive indicator of good corporate governance, 
thereby increasing firm value. 
5.2.4. Ownership nature 
The Chinese economy is experiencing a period of unparalleled wealth and growth 
opportunities. The mandate to improve the corporate governance of Chinese companies as 
part of the government's efforts to develop the financial market has become one of the top 
priorities listed in the Chinese national agenda. We believe that Chinese firms affiliated 
with the government are more likely to implement cumulative voting in the election of 
board of directors as a show of support to this government policy. We believe the market 
responds positively to such firms due to the expectation that the government would 
probably provide monetary benefits to those that support government policy. 
5.2.5. Board of directors and supervisors 
Jensen (1993) has argued that board meetings are reactive, rather than proactive measures. 
N. Vafeas (1999) found that boards meet more often following poor performance. He 
empirically found that the annual number of board meetings is inversely related to firm 
value. Frequent board meetings indicate poor performance. Therefore, cumulative voting is 
not likely so as to avoid the cost of dissent in the board. However, for firms with good 
corporate governance but with frequent board meetings, cumulative voting announcement is 
definitely a positive signal to the market, which increases market value. 
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As for independent directors, there is an argument that outside director members are only 
given limited interaction time to perform their monitoring role. This problem is a by-
product of the fact that chief executive officers almost always set the agenda for board 
meetings according to Jensen (1993). Therefore, studies found that firms with boards 
consisting of a majority of independent directors do not perform better than firms without 
such boards. In China, according to an empirical study by Chen, Fan and Wong (2004)， 
almost 50% of independent directors are appointed by state-controlling owners, and another 
30% is affiliated with various layers of governmental agencies. If the firm has solid 
corporate governance and operating performance, and does not engage in tunneling, they 
would implement cumulative voting to raise firm value. We believe that firms with a high 
ratio of independent directors provide a stronger positive signal that the independent 
directors of the firm play their monitoring role effectively, raising the probability of electing 
real "independent" directors to better monitor the company and further increasing firm 
value. The higher the ratio of independent directors in the board, the stronger the positive 
signal; hence, a higher increase in firm value. 
5.2.6. Compensations of top executives 
Another essential component of good corporate governance mechanism is an effective 
compensation system for top executives. Agency theory predicts that compensation policy 
should be designed to give the top executives opportunity to select and implement activities 
that increase shareholder wealth. Murphy (1999) finds a positive relationship between 
executive pay and performance in the U.S., Germany, and Japan. Kato and Long (2006) 
have discovered statistically significant sensitivities and elasticities of compensation for 
executives with respect to shareholder value. Therefore, the top executives' compensation 
sensitivity towards firm performance is a good proxy of how good the corporate governance 
is. We believe stronger top executives' pay-performance sensitivity on shareholder wealth is 
associated with firms that implement cumulative voting in the election of board of directors. 
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This is because the high cost of dissent in the board of directors and the occurrence of 
tunneling are unlikely for cumulative voting firms since they have good corporate 
governance and operating performance. 
6. Methodology 
We investigated the relationship between corporate governance mechanism, operating 
performance of firms, and the short-term market responses towards the announcement of 
cumulative voting. Furthermore, we estimated the long-term relationship between 
cumulative voting and the change of corporate governance mechanism, operating 
performance, and market firm value. Therefore, in this section, we first quantified 
cumulative voting in the election of board of directors in annual shareholders' meetings, 
corporate governance characteristics, operating performance, and firm market value based 
on the following aspects. 
6.1. Cumulative voting in the election of the board of director 
Firms elect directors during a company's annual shareholders' meeting. We captured the 
voting mechanism of firms for further analysis by creating the dummy variable 
Cumulative一Voting, which is equal to 1 if the annual shareholder's meeting of the firm 
involves the election of directors by cumulative voting and 0 otherwise. Some firms also 
elect supervisors by cumulative voting during their annual shareholders' meeting, which 
does not satisfy the criteria to assign the dummy variable as 1. 
6.2. Ownership concentration and characteristics 
To capture the relationship between shareholding structure and cumulative voting 
mechanism in the election of the board of directors, we have to quantify the shareholding 
structure and ownership concentration. We denoted the stake of the largest shareholder as 
1 一Shareholder. It is the percentage of shares held by the controlling shareholder indicated 
in the previous financial report before the event. To capture the ownership concentration of 
substantial shareholders, we used the variable HerfindahlJtolO. It is a Herfindahl index 
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measuring the concentration of shares held by the top 10 stockholders, excluding the 
controlling shareholder, as indicated in the previous financial report published before the 
event. It is computed as the sum of the square of percentage of shares held by the to 10出 
largest stockholders. 
To study the costs and benefits of minority shareholders in monitoring the firm 
operations and controlling shareholder, we quantified the activity of minority shareholders. 
We constructed the variable Minority_Activeness, which refers to the total percentage of 
shares participated in the pervious annual shareholders' meeting minus percentage of shares 
of the top 3 largest shareholders. We also created a dummy variable Chairman_CEO, which 
is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board of directors during the annual 
shareholders' meeting and 0 otherwise. This is a variable to proxy whether or not the CEO 
is very likely to set the agenda for board meetings (Jensen, 1993). 
6.3. Legal framework 
For firms with good corporate governance and operating performance but are not listing 
in the B or H share markets, cumulative voting is a good indicator of good corporate 
governance and operating performance. In order to quantify the legal framework, we 
created a dummy variable BH一Share, which is equal to 1 if the firm lists as B or H share 
and 0 otherwise. 
6.4. Firm Operation Policy 
Variables related to firm operation policy are good indicators of whether or not the 
controlling shareholder is suspected of engaging in tunneling. We construct a variable 
PlaceRightJEquities, it is 3-year average annual percentage of places equity and rights 
issues of share to total outstanding shares within 3 years before the event. One of the 
common ways of tunneling is by connection transaction. However, subject to the constraint 
of incomplete data, we capture the change by the variable BuySell_Assets, it is the natural 
logarithm the number that the company bought or sold assets successfully as major 
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transaction plus 1 within 3 years before the event. To capture the effect of dividend policy, 
we use the variable Dividend%, it is 3-year average annual percentage of cash dividend 
yield within 3 years before the event. Meanwhile, both the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) disclose the corporate scandal to firms if 
it violates regulations. We understand an unconstrained substantial shareholder misusing 
firm resources, which is one kind of tunneling, is one of the common reasons for regulation 
violation. Therefore, to detect potential tunneling, we constructed the variable Scandal 
which is the natural logarithm of the number of corporate scandal record from stock 
exchange plus 1 in 3 years before the event. 
6.5. Ownership Nature 
Ownership nature is an essential factor for our study since we believe firms with 
government background tend to support the government's policies. To capture the 
ownership nature, we construct four dummy variables named State—Owned, 
Domestic—Owned, ForeignjDwned and Others_Owned. They denote dummy variables that 
equal to 1 if the company is state-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise, dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if the company is domestic-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise, dummy variable 
that equals to 1 if the company foreign investor-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise and 
dummy variable that equals to 1 if the company is collectively-owned, socially-owned or 
employee-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise. 
6.6. Board of directors and supervisors 
Activeness of board of directors plays an important role in measuring the quality of 
corporate governance. It is interesting to investigate the relationship between cumulative 
voting in the election of the board of directors and the board activeness after Jensen (1993) 
argues that board meetings are reactive, rather than proactive measures. N. Vafeas (1999) 
found that boards meet more often following poor performance and Chen, Fan and Wong 
(2004) discovered almost 50% of independent directors are appointed by state-controlling 
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owners. Therefore, we capture the board of directors' characteristics by 
Independent_Director, Director—Meeting, Supervisor一Meeting and 
Non—Pos—Director—Comments, They denote percentage of independent directors within the 
board of directors during the previous release of financial report before the event, natural 
logarithm of the number of board of directors meeting plus 1 in year before the event, 
natural logarithm of the number of board of supervisors meetings plus 1 in year before the 
event, natural logarithm of the number of non-positive director comments plus 1 within 3 
years before the event. 
6.7. Top Executives' compensations 
Regarding top executives' compensations, according to Jensen and Murphy (1990), it 
includes salary, bonus, stock options and inside stock ownership. However, stock options 
and bonus informations are not complete and often inaccessible. Also, stock options only 
appeared in China starting from 2006 and it is still uncommon as of today. Therefore, we 
capture the executive compensation characteristics using Executive—Share, which is the 
percentage of share held by top executives during the previous release of financial report 
before the event. In the top executives' pay-performance sensitivity analysis, we used the 
variable Change—Compensations, which is the annual change of salary plus the annual 
change of market value of inside stock ownership. 
6.8. Operating performance 
We capture the firm's operating performance based on the framework developed by 
Fama and French (2001). We capture the firm's operating performance on the aspects of 
size, investment opportunities, profitability, free cash flow and leverage. We capture the 
firm size effect using In A, which is natural logarithm of total asset in previous release of 
financial report before the event. Moreover, we capture the firm investment opportunities by 
OPG, which is yearly growth rate of operating profit in previous release of financial report 
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before the event. We capture the firm profitability by OP/A, ROA and ROE. They denote the 
ratio of operating profit to total asset, ratio of net profit to total asset and net profit to total 
equity in previous release of financial report before the event. We capture the free cash flow 
by RE/A. It denotes the ratio of retained earning to total asset in previous release of financial 
report before the event. Finally, we capture the leverage of firm by LL/A which denotes the 
ratio of long-term liability to total asset in previous release of financial report before the 
event. Firm operating performance variables not only created as control variables, but are 
also created for investigating short-term market reaction to cumulative voting 
announcement and firms' operating performance as well as served as measurements of 
long-term change in operating performance for cumulative voting firms compared with 
straight voting firms. 
6.9. Industry sectors 
To control for the industry effect, we capture the industry category by creating industry 
classification dummy variables according to GICS classification (Appendix I). We use 
dummy variables named Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer_Discretionary, 
Consumer-Staples, Health—Care, Financials, IT, Telecom and Utilities. They denote 
dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the company is categorized into in Energy, Materials, 
Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, 
Information Technology, Telecommunication Services and Utilities sector respectively 
according to the GICS classification. 
6.10. Market firm value 
To measure how cumulative voting in the election of the board of directors is associated 
with change of long-term market firm valuation, we quantify market firm value by widely 
used measure, namely Tobin 's q. Tobin's q is normalized with respect to the size of the firm, 
following the definition of Chung and Pruitt (1994) as represented by the following formula: 
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^ L. , MVCS + BVLTD + BVINV + BVCL - BVCA 
lobin s q = 
BVTA 
where MVCS is the market value of the firm's common stock shares, BVLTD is the book 
value of the firm's long-term debt, BVINV is the book value of the firm's inventories, BVCL 
is the book value of the firm's current liabilities, BVCA is the book value of the firm's 
current assets and BVTA is the book value of the firm's total assets. 
6.11. Event study approach 
We used the event study method to estimate the short-term market response at the firm 
level to the announcement of the implementation of cumulative voting. The most common 
economic model that provides restrictions is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
However, deviations from the CAPM have been discovered, implying that the validity of 
the restrictions imposed by the CAPM on the market model is questionable (Fama and 
French, 1996). Jin and Liu (2001) have discovered that there are other factors affecting the 
return of China's stock market and that there is no direct relation between stock return and 
the beta. Thus, they concluded that CAPM does not apply to China's stock market. Based 
on this, we amended the traditional economic model using the stock daily returns minus the 
daily market index return to estimate the abnormal daily returns. This prevents the use of 
beta to capture systematic risk. We used the firm's announcement day of implementation as 
the event day. For each firm sample, we facilitated the following event windows around the 
announcement day (day 0): (-1,1), (-3,3)，(-5,5), and (-10,10). We then tested the 
significance of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), which is the sum of abnormal daily 
returns in event window, which proxies the short-term market response. We included the 
days before the event day to capture market response under information leakage, which we 
believed to be common in the stock market. Only firms that announced the implementation 
of cumulative voting in election of board of directors were included in our sample. We 
eliminated those that did not make the announcement but did implement cumulative voting; 
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this is because of the uncertainty involved in the act of making an announcement and the 
exact day it was done. Therefore, it is impossible to measure these firms' short-term market 
responses. 
Apart from estimating the short-term market response on cumulative voting 
announcement at the firm level, we also estimated the relationship between firm corporate 
governance mechanism and operating performance with CAR of individual firms subject to 
cumulative voting announcement. We used both univariate comparisons and multivariate 
OLS regressions. For the univariate tests, we separated the samples for comparison 
according to corporate governance and operating performance variables to study the 
difference in their average CAR. The samples were grouped into either "above median" or 
‘‘below median" group by different variables if the variable was quantitative variable. Then 
we compared the average CAR of the two groups. As for qualitative variable (dummy 
variable), the samples were grouped into “0” and "1" by different variables and we 
compared the average CAR of the two groups. 
Apart from the univariate tests, we also used multivariate OLS regressions to study the 
relationship of how the difference in corporate governance and operating performance of 
firms subject to cumulative voting announcement relate to the difference in CAR. The 
model is as follows: 
CARi = Bq 丨丨 Variables 丨 
n 
where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return of firm i in the event window (-3,3). 
Other variables include: 
l_Shareholder=?Qrcer\t3igQ of share held by the largest shareholder of firm i during the 
previous release of financial report 
Herfindahl_2to]0=A Herfmdahl index that measures the concentration of shares held by the 
top 10 stockholders excluding the controlling one of firm i during the previous release of 
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financial report. It is computed as sum of square of the percentage of share held by the 2nd 
to 10th largest stockholders 
Minority_Activeness= Percentage of share participated in the previous annual shareholders' 
meeting minus percentage of share of the top three largest shareholders of firm i 
BH_Share= A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i lists as B or H share 
Chairman_CEO= A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman during 
the annual shareholders meeting of firm i 
BuySell_Assets= Natural logarithm of the number that firm i bought or sold asset 
successfully as major transaction plus 1 in previous 3 years 
Scandal= Natural logarithm of the number of scandal from stock exchange plus 1 in 
previous 3 years of firm i 
State_Owned= A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is state-owned enterprise 
Domestic _Owned=K dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is domestic-owned enterprise 
Others_Owned= A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is collectively-owned, socially-
owned or employee-owned enterprise 
Independent_Director =Ratio of independent director in board of directors of firm i 
Director_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the number of board of director meeting plus 1 in 
previous year of firm i 
Supervisor_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the number of board of supervisor meeting plus 
1 in previous year of firm i 
Non_Pos_Director_Comments= Natural logarithm of the number of non-positive director 
comment plus 1 in previous 3 years of firm i 
Executive_Share=?QxcQr\XdigQ of share held by top executives of firm i during the previous 
release of financial report 
Energy, Materials, Consumer^—Discretionary, ConsumerJStaples, Health_Care, Financials, 
IT, Utilities: A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is categorized into Energy, Materials, 
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Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, Information 
Technology and Utilities sector respectively in GICS classification. 
LnA= Natural logarithm of total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
i 
OPG =Yearly growth rate of operating profit during the previous release of financial report 
of firm i 
OP/A =Ratio of operating profit to total asset during the previous release of financial report 
of firm i 
RE/A 二Ratio of retained earning to total asset during the previous release of financial report 
of firm i 
LL/A= Ratio of long term liability to total asset during the previous release of financial 
report of firm i 
6.12. Matched Propensity Scores Approach 
To estimate the long-term relationship between changes of corporate governance, 
operating performance, market firm value, and the implementation of cumulative voting in 
election of board of directors, our research design required the creation of control sample of 
annual shareholders' meetings from firms subject to straight voting within the sample 
period of 2004 - 2006. Each first annual shareholders' meeting subject to cumulative voting 
of any firm was matched with an annual shareholders' meeting subject to straight voting 
from the firm which implemented the straight voting. The matching was conducted using 
the matched propensity scores approach. This is an approach to control selection bias, in 
which the predicted probabilities from the first stage logistics/ probit model are used for 
matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). According to our discussion on theoretical 
backgrounds and the causal effect of corporate governance mechanism with cumulative 
voting, we developed a multivariate logistic regression model to explain the implementation 
of cumulative voting in the election of the board of directors. The model was used as the 
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first stage logistics model to obtain predicted probabilities for the annual shareholders' 
meetings within the sample period (2004-2006). The propensity scores were then matched 
to an annual shareholders' meeting subject to straight voting from the firm which 
implemented straight voting with the closest propensity score within the sample period. The 
matching was conducted using the using the predicted probabilities from the following first 
stage logistics model for Cumulative_Voting: 
Cumulative _Voting I = Bq + 丨丨 Variables 丨 
n 
In the above, Cumulative—Voting refers to a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firm i 
implements cumulative voting for the first time during the annual shareholders' meeting; 
Other variables include: 
I_Shareholder=?QrcQntSLge of share held by the largest shareholder of firm i during the 
previous release of financial report 
Herfindahl_2tolO=A Herfindahl index that measures the concentration of shares held by the 
top 10 stockholders excluding the controlling one of firm i during the previous release of 
financial report. It is computed as sum of square of the percentage of share held by the 2nd 
to 10th largest stockholders 
Minority_Activeness= Percentage of share participated in the previous annual shareholders' 
meeting minus percentage of share of the top three largest shareholders of firm i during last 
shareholders meeting 
BH_Share= A dummy variable that equals 1 if the company lists as B or H share 
Chairman—CEO A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of firm i 
during the annual shareholders meeting 
BuySell_Assets= Natural logarithm of the number that firm i bought or sold asset 
successfully as major transaction plus 1 in previous 3 years 
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Scandal= Natural logarithm of the number of scandal from stock exchange plus 1 in 
previous 3 years of firm i 
State_Owned= A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is state-owned enterprise 
Domestic_Owned=K dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is domestic-owned enterprise 
Others_Owned=K dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is collectively-owned, socially-
owned or employee-owned enterprise 
Independent_Director =Ratio of independent director in board of directors of firm i 
Director_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the number of board of directors meeting plus 1 in 
previous year of firm i 
Supervisor_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the number of board of supervisor meeting plus 
1 in previous year of firm i 
Executive_Share=?QXCQnidigQ of share held by top executives of firm i during the previous 
release of financial report 
Energy, Materials, Consumer_Discretionary, Consumer^—Staples, Health一Care, Financials, 
IT, Telecom, Utilities: A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is categorized into Energy, 
Materials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, 
Information Technology, Telecommunication Services and Utilities sector respectively in 
GICS classification. 
The objective of the first stage logistics model is to create a control sample 
{Cumulative_Voting=0) that is one-to-one matched to the observations in the treatment 
sample {Cumulative_Voting= 1) based on the predicted propensity score. 
6.13. Top Executives' Pay-Performance Sensitivities 
The matched propensity scores approach only generated the control and treatment group. 
Given that top executives pay-performance sensitivities are good proxies of quality of 
corporate governance according to Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Murphy (1999)，we 
captured the difference between top executives pay-performance sensitivities of cumulative 
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voting (treatment group) and straight voting firms groups (control group) before and after 
the annual shareholders' meeting. We applied the method developed by Murphy (1999) to 
capture the top executives' pay-performance sensitivities through the following regression: 
Change_ Compensation-^ 二 B。+ Change_Shareholder _ Wealth-^ 
Where: 
Change_Compensation=YQdix\y percentage change of top executives' salary market price of 
shareholding of firm i at time t 
Change_Shareholder_Wealth=YQar\y percentage change of market capitalization of the 
firm i at time t 
We used salary and inside stock ownership to proxy for the top executives' 
compensation because stock options are uncommon in China, only appearing in 2006. In 
addition, information on stock option and bonus are not complete and often inaccessible. 
Using the method described above, we are able to study top executives pay-performance 
sensitivities of four groups: cumulative voting firms group (treatment group) before and 
after annual shareholders' meeting, as well as the straight voting firms groups (control 
group) before and after annual shareholders' meeting. 
6.14. Difference in differences approach 
To estimate the long-term relationships between the implementation of cumulative voting 
in election of board of directors and change of firm corporate governance, operating 
performance and market firm value, we apply difference in differences approach based on 
Card and Krueger (1994) model on the control and treatment groups selected by matched 
propensity scores approach. 
We first test the difference of long-term change of corporate governance, operating 
performance and market firm value measures of cumulative voting firms group (treatment 
group) with straight voting firms group (control group) by univariate test. We take 
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difference for the 3-year average of variables capturing corporate governance, operating 
performance and market firm value after the annual shareholders' meeting from 3-year 
average before the annual shareholder meeting within the sample group. For variables 
capturing number of buy/sell asset and number of corporate scandal, those are 
Buy Sell—Assets and Scandal, we take difference of the natural logarithm of the number plus 
1 in 3 years after the annual shareholders' meeting from the natural logarithm of the 
number plus 1 in 3 years before the annual shareholders' meeting directly. Then we 
compare the variables' average differences across the two groups to see if there are 
significant differences by using t-tests. Since this approach needs 3 years of data both 
before and after the annual shareholders' meeting for studying the long-term relationship, 
our sample period is also limited from 2004 to 2006. In these studies, we have to expand the 
definitions of variables defined before. They not only capture values of the specified 
variable in the period before annual shareholders' meeting, but also period after annual 
shareholders' meeting in order to compare the differences. As for the multivariate test, we 
apply the following Difference in differences regression. Each variable capturing corporate 
governance mechanism, operating performance as well as market firm value, denoted Y., is 
regressed on time dummy denoted by T]，voting mechanism dummy denoted 
by Cumulative— Votingi, the interaction term of time and voting mechanism dummy and a 
set of control variables capturing firm characteristics: 
Y. = B^+BJi + B^Cumulative _Votingi + B^T. * Cumulative _Votingi + Control. 
n 
Where 
T=A time dummy variable that equals 1 if it is the time after annual shareholders' meeting 
for firm i 
Cumulative_Voting=A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i implements cumulative voting 
in election of board of directors during shareholders' meeting 
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Control=ConXxo\ variables of firm i including the following variables with (Control) at the 
back 
Y. are the dependent variables include: 
Pay—Performance—Sensitivity=3-yedLT： average annual percentage change of top executives' 
salary market price of shareholding to annual percentage change of market capitalization of 
firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
PlaceRight_Equities= 3-year average annual percentage of place equities and rights issues 
of share to total outstanding shares of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years 
(when T=l) 
BiiySell一Assets: Natural logarithm of the number that firm i bought or sold asset 
successfully as major transaction plus 1 in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years 
(when T=l) 
Dmdend%= 3-year average annual percentage of cash dividend yield of firm i in previous 3 
years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
Scandal: Natural logarithm of the number of scandal from stock exchange plus 1 for firm i 
in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
Director_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the 3-year average annual number of board of 
directors of firm i meeting plus 1 in previous 3 years(when T=0) / in next 3 years (when 
T二 1) 
Supervisor_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the 3-year average annual number of board of 
supervisors meeting of firm i plus 1 in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when 
T=l) 
Non_Pos_Director_Comments= Natural logarithm of the 3-year average annual number of 
non-positive director comment of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years 
(when T=l) 
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ROA= 3-year average annual ratio of net profit to total asset in previous results 
announcement of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
ROE= 3-year average annual ratio of net profit to total equity in previous results 
announcement of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
LnA= Natural logarithm of 3-year average annual total Asset in previous results 
announcement of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
OPG = 3-year average annual growth rate of operating profit in annual in previous results 
announcement of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
OPZ4=3-year average annual ratio of operating profit to total asset in previous results 
announcement of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
RE/A = 3-year average annual ratio of retained earning to total asset in previous results 
announcement of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
LZ/4二3-year average annual ratio of long-term liability to total asset in previous results 
announcement of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
robin 's <7=3-year average annual Tobin's q in previous results announcement of firm i in 
previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
Theoretically, B^  indicates cumulative voting is associated with long-term significant 
change on corporate governance, operating performance and firm market value measures 
compared with straight voting firms having controlled time trend and firm characteristics if 
B了 is significant. 
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7. Data 
7.1. Sources of Data 
We used company announcements culled from sina.com.cn to identify the firm 
announcement days of the implementation of cumulative voting that occurred from 2001 to 
2008. Appendix II presents the sample cumulative voting announcement. Meanwhile, 
information regarding the elections of board of directors, corporate governance 
characteristics, firm operating performance, market firm value, and individual stocks and 
indexes returns were collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR), as compiled by The University of Hong Kong and GTA Information 
Technology Company Ltd., Shenzhen. Appendix III shows the sample information on board 
of directors elections conducted via cumulative voting. We also used the online database of 
the SHSE and SZSE to identify corporate scandals that occurred during the sample period. 
7.2. Cumulative voting announcements and firm characteristics 
A total of 393 firms announced the implementation of cumulative voting in election of 
the board of directors during the period from 2001 to 2008. Table 1 summarizes the yearly 
distribution of announcements from firms. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
A set of variables indicating the firm characteristics of the 393 firms during the 
specified period is summarized in Table 2. They are usually state owned enterprises 
(73.79% of total or 290 firms) and are usually not listed as B or H share (93.89% of total or 
369 firms). No firm came from the Telecommunication Services sector and the Materials, 
Industrials and Consumer Discretionaries are the top 3 popular sectors (20.87%, 20.61% 
and 18.83% of total or 82’ 81 and 74 firms respectively). They also have positive average 
OP/A (3.2%). 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
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A total of 23885 annual shareholders' meetings took place from 2002 to 2008, where 642 
firms conduct 651 meetings involve cumulative voting in the election of board of directors, 
5899 firms conducted 6033 meetings involving straight voting in election of board of 
directors. Panel A of Table 3 summarizes the distribution of annual shareholders' meetings 
and involved number of firm. We can see among all annual shareholders' meetings from all 
firms from 2002 to 2008, only 651 (9.74% of total meetings) or 642 (9.84% of firms 
implement cumulative voting in election of board of director. Using straight voting is still 
the major trend in electing the board or directors with 6038 (90.26% of total meeting) or 
5899 (90.38% of firms) firms implemented straight voting. 
Panel B of table 3 shows the yearly distribution of firm that holds the first annual 
shareholders' meeting involving the implementation of cumulative voting in election of 
board of director between 2002 and 2008. The most popular year is 2005，in which 208 
firms (45.61% of total firm) implemented the first cumulative voting during the annual 
shareholders' meeting for the first time. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
8. Empirical Results 
8.1. Short-term market response 
8.1.1. Event study 
We first conducted an event study with a series of event windows to investigate 
empirically how the market responded towards the announcement of the implementation of 
cumulative voting in the election of a company's board of directors. We used the stock daily 
returns minus the daily market index return to estimate the abnormal daily returns. For each 
firm in the sample, we facilitated the following event windows around the announcement 
day (day 0): (-1，1), (-3，3)，(-5, 5), and (-10, 10). The announcement days of the 
implementation of cumulative voting were taken from sina.com.cn，while the relevant daily 
stocks returns and indexes returns were taken from the GTR daily returns file. The CAR of 
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all event windows is positively significant. We summarized the CAR results with event 
windows (-1, 1)，（-3，3)，(-5, 5), and (-10，10) in Table 4. We also summarized the AR and 
CAR results with event window (-3，3) in Table 5. The t-statistics of the CAR is 3.90 and is 
positively significant at the 1% level. We found that on average, the announcement 
significantly added around 4.7% of value for firms on average. The trading day after the 
announcement day (Day 1) also contributed most of the positive AR. The results therefore 
support Hypothesis 1. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
8.1.2. Univariate test 
We conducted a univariate two tailed t-test to examine how corporate governance and 
firm operating performance characteristics are associated with the difference in CAR. We 
used the CAR from event window (-3，3) for the analysis because it is the most significant 
among all event windows that we have tested. The CAR of the event window (-3，3) has a t-
value of 3.9 and is significant at the 1% level. Table 6 summarizes the descriptive statistics 
of CAR of the 393 firms by grouping them into above median/ "1" group or below median/ 
"0" group based on the different firm characteristics. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
We separated the 393 sample firms into either the "above median" or "below median" 
group if the variable was a quantitative variable. As for qualitative variable (dummy 
variable), we compare between “1” and “0” group. Table 6 also shows the results of the t-
test on the average CAR within group between 2 groups according to the firm 
characteristics variables. First, the CAR responds more positively to the announcement of 
the implementation of cumulative voting in election of board of directors for firms with 
more active minority shareholders since Minority_Activeness is significant at the 1% level. 
This supports our belief that cumulative voting in election of board of directors creates firm 
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value since the more active are the minority shareholders, the more effective is the 
cumulative voting in electing minority shareholders' favored representatives and thus the 
strong positive signal it is. Therefore, the more active the minority shareholders, the higher 
premium on the firm value for implementation of cumulative voting. BH—Share is 
significant at the 5% level. It implies that firms without listing as B or H share responded 
more positively to the announcement. This supports our belief that cumulative voting 
announcement is a strong signal of good corporate governance for firms which are not 
listing in B or H share markets but have good corporate governance. Moreover, 
Independent_Director is significant at the 10% level, it shows firms with above median 
percentage of independent director responds more positively on CAR to the announcement. 
These are consistent to our belief that the announcement of cumulative voting gives a signal 
of having good corporate governance or no tunneling, so the market responded positively. 
Others—Owned is significant at the 1% significant level. Socially-owned, employee-owned 
and collectively-owned enterprises usually have certain government background. The 
positive response is due to cumulative voting announcement is a support to government 
efforts. The market expects certain benefits from the government. As for the operating 
performance variable, OPG is significant at the 5% level while OP/A is significant at the 
1% level. They show firms with stronger operating performance responded more positively 
on CAR to the announcement. We believe the announcement of cumulative voting signals a 
sustainable strong operating performance under controlling shareholders' estimation, so the 
market responses positively. 
8.1.3. Multivate OLS regressions 
We conducted a set of multivariate OLS regressions to examine how corporate 
governance mechanism and firm operating performance are associated with the difference 
in CAR. The empirical results are summarized in Table 7. Minority_Activness is significant 
at the 1% level in model 1’ 6, 7 and 8. It supports our belief that cumulative voting in 
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election of board of directors create firm value since the more active the minority 
shareholders are, the more effective is the cumulative voting in electing minority 
shareholders' favored representatives and thus the strong positive signal it is. 
IndependentJDirector is positively significant at the 1% level in model 4 and 5 and 
positively significant at the 5% level in model 6，supporting our belief that for firms with a 
high ratio of independent director, when the firm has good corporate governance and 
operating performance, implementing cumulative voting in the election of board of directors 
provides a positive signal that those independent directors of the firm play a monitoring role 
effectively and it raises the probability of electing real "independent" directors to better 
monitor the company, these increase firm value. The higher the ratio of independent 
director in board of directors, the stronger the signal. Meanwhile, Director_Meeting is 
negatively significant at the 10% significant level in model 5. It supports the views that 
market believes firms with frequent board meeting have poor corporate governance. 
Cumulative voting thus creates strong cost of dissent in board of director if cumulative 
voting is implemented. As for the operating performance, OP/A is positively significant at 
the 5% level in model 1 and 8 while positively significant at 10% level at model 3, 4，5 and 
7. It is consistent to our belief that the announcement of cumulative voting signals a 
sustainable strong operating performance under controlling shareholders' estimation, so the 
market responds positively. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
8.2. Long-term impact 
8.2.1. Matched Propensity Scores 
We first matched each first annual shareholders' meeting subject to cumulative voting of 
each firm with any annual shareholders' meeting from any firm subject to straight voting 
consistently within 2004 to 2006. There are 2572 observations, and the matching was 
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conducted by matched propensity scores. This is an approach to control selection bias. The 
first stage logistics model results are shown in Table 8. The adjusted-R-squared is 0.0544. 
The model chooses the sample pool for further analysis by matching the closest predicted 
probabilities from the treatment and control groups. There are totally 568 samples after 
matching, 284 samples for firms with cumulative voting in election of board of director 
(Treatment group) and straight voting (Control group) respectively. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
8.2.2. Top Executives' Pay-Performance Sensitivities 
In this section, we investigate empirically how the difference in corporate governance, 
operating performance and market firm valuation of the two groups of firm are associated 
with different mechanisms. We first studied the quality of corporate governance between 
treatment and control group before and after annual shareholders' meetings by the proxy of 
top executives' pay-performance sensitivities. From Table 9, we can see the top executives' 
pay-performance sensitivities are both positively significant at 1% level before and after 
annual shareholders' meetings for treatment group, the value are 0.4327 and 0.1944 
respectively. However, the top executives' pay-performance sensitivities are insignificant 
before and after annual shareholders' meetings. These confirm cumulative voting firms 
have better corporate governance level no matter it is before or after cumulative voting 
implementation compared with straight voting firms. Although the top executives' pay-
performance sensitivities of cumulative voting firms group dropped from 0.4327 before the 
annual shareholders' meetings to 0.1944 after annual shareholders' meetings, it does not 
demonstrate worsening corporate governance due to the following two reasons. First, China 
introduced stock option in 2006, but the top executives' compensations do not include stock 
option as well as bonus in our definition since the information of stock option is not 
complete and often inaccessible. Second, according to Jensen and Murphy (1990), pay-
performance sensitivities of CEO generally decline overtimes due to political reasons. 
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Therefore, compared with the straight voting firms group, we did not discover more serious 
worsening corporate governance in the cumulative voting firms group. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
8.2.3. Univariate test 
Table 10 shows the results of the difference in differences univariate t-test. "Before" in 
the table shows the 3-year average value of natural logarithm of the number plus 1 in 3 
years for the specified variables before the election in annual shareholders' meeting by 
specified voting mechanism, ‘‘After” is the reverse. "Difference" is the "After" value minus 
“Before" value. The results support Hypothesis 2. For variables capturing corporate 
governance, Pay_Performance_sensitivity is a standard measure of corporate governance 
while it is insignificant. It suggests the degree of improvement on corporate governance for 
cumulative voting firms group is not significantly difference from the degree of 
improvement on corporate governance of straight voting firms group. DirectorJdeeting 
shows the significant difference for the cumulative voting firms group firms at the 5% level 
compared with straight voting firms group. That is, the increase in number of board of 
directors meeting is lesser for cumulative voting firms comparing with straight voting firms 
on average. These support Hypothesis 2 as degree of improvement in corporate governance 
for the cumulative voting firms group is not worse than straight voting firms group. As for 
operating performance, increase in ROE for cumulative voting firms group is significant at 
the 10% level compared with the straight voting firms group. These empirical results 
support Hypothesis 2 in the sense that when controlling shareholder foresees firm will 
continue with good corporate governance, operating performance and not engage in 
tunneling, the controlling shareholder allows the implementation of cumulative voting in 
election of board of directors. Thus, the degree of improvement in profitability is even 
strong for cumulative voting firms. Also, the market firm value captured by Tobin's q as 
well as other variables capturing corporate governance and operating performance is not 
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significantly different for the two groups. This means the change on these aspects are not 
different significantly for the two groups. These support Hypothesis 2 in the sense that apart 
from Director—Meeting, ROE and RE/A increase/decrease in other variables capturing either 
corporate governance or firm value for cumulative voting firms are not stronger 
significantly compared with straight voting firms. Univariate test does not control firm 
characteristics. Thus, the results are not as convincing as multivariate test controlling firm 
characteristics. Therefore, we tested Hypothesis 2 again through a multivariate test which is 
a series of difference in differences regressions in next section. 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
8.2.4. Difference in Differences regressions 
Same as univariate test, the empirical results support Hypothesis 2. We focused on the 
coefficient of the interaction independent variable of Cumulative—Voting and Time Dummy 
denoted by T, which is B^  as it represents the difference in changes of the two groups for 
the dependent variable over time having control time trend and firm characteristics. For 
dependent variables capturing corporate governance, we look at Table 11. All variables 
including Pay—Perfonnance—Sensitivity are insignificant. This means there is no evidence 
that the degree of improvement on corporate governance, operating performance and market 
firm value for cumulative voting firms group are worse than firms without cumulative 
voting. It supports Hypothesis 2. As for operating performance variables, we come to table 
12. ROE is positively significant at the 10% level, indicating cumulative voting firms 
group's increase in profitability on average is stronger than straight voting firms group. 
RE/A is positively significant at the 5% level, indicating that cumulative voting firms 
group's increase in Retained Equity to Total Asset ratios compared with straight voting 
firms group is significantly stronger. As Komai and Matits (1984) and Farrell (1991) have 
discovered Chinese data reveal a substantial and growing link between profit and retained 
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earnings, thereby supporting a significant stronger improvement in operating performance 
and are consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, when coming to Table 13，which shows 
market firm value variable, Tobin 's q, it is insignificant for the interaction variable, B^ • 
This means that cumulative voting firms do not associate with change in long-term market 
firm valuation compared with the straight voting firms. It is consistent with Hypothesis 2 in 
the sense that the degree of improvement for cumulative voting firms on market firm value 
is not worse than firms without cumulative voting. We argue this can be explained by 
market efficiency. During the point of time that the firm announces the implementation of 
cumulative voting the information that under the controlling shareholders' estimation, the 
good corporate governance and operating performance of the firm are likely to continue in 
the long term, has been reflected in the positive short term market reaction (positive CAR 
we discover). Thus, firm market valuation does not change significantly due to voting 
mechanism any more in the long-term. 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
9. Conclusions 
The stock market in China is young and corporate governance is a prominent issue. One 
of the important measures for improving Chinese firms' corporate governance was 
cumulative voting in election of the board of directors. Cumulative voting in the election of 
board of directors is nothing new to world stock history. However, its' history in the China 
stock market is short and there is no study on its' meaning to China's stock market. 
In this paper, we estimated the short term market response at the firm level to the 
announcement of implementing cumulative voting in election of the board of directors by 
event study. We discovered that the market responds positively to the cumulative voting 
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announcement. At firm level, for firms with more a active minority shareholder group, the 
higher ratio of independent director in board of director and stronger operating profit to 
asset ratio, the more the market responds positively in terms of CAR. We analyzed the 
rationale motivating controlling shareholders to implement cumulative voting in the election 
of board of directors. By comparing top executives' pay-performance sensitivities, we 
discovered that cumulative voting firms have better corporate governance no matter before 
or after cumulative voting implementation. We also estimate how the implementation of 
cumulative voting in the election of board of directors is associated with change in 
corporate governance, and operating performance and firm market valuation in long term. 
We discovered that cumulative voting does not associate with stronger improvement in firm 
value in the long-term compared with straight voting firms. Also, cumulative voting firms 
are not associate with stronger improvement on corporate governance mechanism 
comparing with straight voting firms. Nevertheless, there are sets of evidence showing that 
the implementation of cumulative voting is associated with improved as increase of return 
on equity (ROE) and retained earning to total asset ratio (RE/A) and that it is significant for 
cumulative voting firms group compared with straight voting firms group. Although 
cumulative voting in the election of the board of directors in the China stock market is 
permissive in nature currently, our study shows that it still plays a signaling effect on 
indicating good firm corporate governance and operating performance. 
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Table 1: 
Descriptive statistics for firms announcing the implementation of cumulative voting in the election of board of directors 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total: 
No. of Finn: 7 153 43 76 87 17 8 2 393 
% of Total: 1.78% 38.93% 10.94% 19.34% 22.14% 4.33% 2.04% 0.51% 100.00% 
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Table 2: 
Descriptive statistics for finn characteristics 
(i=393) 
VARIABLES No. of firm % Median Mean Std.Dev. Max Min 
CAR(%) ^ ^ 23.68 214.06 -17.85 
1 —Shareholder 0.4796 0.4699 0.1597 0.8132 0.0876 
HerfidahlJtolO 0.0042 0.0171 0.0255 0.1399 0 
Minority_Activeness 0.0876 0.1531 0.1710 0.8207 -0.1222 
BH—Share 1 24 6.11 0 0.0611 0.2398 1 0 
0 369 93.89 
ChairmanjOEO 1 48 12.21 0 0.1221 0.3279 1 0 
0 345 87.79 
BuySell—Assets 0.6931 0.8542 0.6876 2.6391 0 
Scandal 0 0.0383 0.1802 1.7918 0 
State_Owned 1 290 73.79 1 0.7379 0.4403 1 0 
0 103 26.21 
Domestic—Owned 1 86 21.88 0 0.2188 0.4140 1 0 
0 307 78.12 
Foreign_Owned 1 2 0.51 0 0.0050 0.0712 1 0 
0 391 99.49 
Others—Owned 1 15 3.82 0 0.0382 0.1918 1 0 
0 378 96.18 
lndependent_ 
Director ~ 0.2857 0.2236 0.1549 0.6 0 
Director—Meeting 1.9459 1.9806 0.3445 3.2581 0 
Supervisor_Meeting 1.3863 1.3686 0.3292 2.4849 0 
Non—Pos 一Director— 
Comments ~ 0 0.0051 0.0712 1 0 
Executive—Share 0 0.0032 0.0215 0.2798 0 
Energy 1 12 3.05 0 0.0305 0.1723 1 0 
0 381 96.95 
Materials 1 82 20.87 0 0.2087 0.4069 1 0 
0 311 79.13 
Industrials 1 81 20.61 0 0.2061 0.4050 1 0 
0 312 79.39 Consumer_ 
Discretion—ary 1 74 18.83 0 0.1883 0.3914 1 0 
0 319 81.17 
Consumer—Staples 1 29 7.38 0 0.0738 0.2618 1 0 
0 364 92.62 
HealthjOare 1 25 6.36 0 0.0636 0.2444 1 0 
0 368 93.64 
Financials 1 29 7.38 0 0.0738 0.2618 1 0 
0 364 92.62 
I T 1 34 8.65 0 0.0865 0.2815 1 0 
0 359 91.35 
Telecom 1 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 
100.0 
0 393 0 
Utilities 1 18 4.58 0 0.0458 0.2093 1 0 
0 375 95.42 
L n A 20.9432 21.0051 0.9611 25.0475 18.6009 
O P G -0.0129 -0.4224 9.9026 94.2719 -90.9423 
O P / A 0.0386 0.0320 0.1301 0.3043 -1.7372 
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RE/A 0.0359 0.0441 0.0445 0.3100 -0.4049 
LL/A 0.0183 0.2176 0.6683 7.7205 0 
C/i/?=Cumulative abnormal return of firm in the event window (-3,3) 
I_Shareholder=?excQni?igQ of share held by the largest shareholder of firm during the previous release of financial report 
Heifindahl_2tol0=\ Herfmdahl index that measures the concentration of shares held by the top 10 stockholders 
excluding the controlling one of firm during the previous release of financial report. It is computed as sum of square of 
the percentage of share held by the 2nd to 10th largest stockholders 
Mi no rity_A cti ven ess= Percentage of share participated in the previous annual shareholders' meeting minus percentage of 
share of the top three largest shareholders of firm 
BH_Slwre= A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm lists as B or H share 
Chairman_CEO= A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman during the annual shareholders 
meeting of firm 
BuySell_Assets= Natural logarithm of the number that firm bought or sold asset successfully as major transaction plus 1 
in previous 3 years 
Scandah Natural logarithm of the number of scandal from stock exchange plus 1 in previous 3 years of firm 
Slate_Owned= A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is state-owned enterprise 
Domestic_Owned=A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is domestic-owned enterprise 
ForeignJdwned=A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is foreign investor-owned enterprise 
OthersJ)wneci=k dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is collectively-owned, socially-owned or employee-owned 
enterprise 
Indepen(ient_Director =Ratio of independent director in board of directors of firm 
Director_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the number of board of director meeting plus 1 in previous year of firm 
Supervisor_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the number of board of supervisor meeting plus 1 in previous year of firm 
Non_Pos_birector_Comments= Natural logarithm of the number of non-positive director comment plus 1 in previous 3 
years of firm 
Execi4tive_Slmre=Percentage： of share held by top executives of firm during the previous release of financial report 
Energy, Tndusthals, Materials, Consumer_Discre(ionary. Consumer_Staples, Health—Care, Financials, IT, Telecom. 
Utilities: A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is categorized into Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunication Services and 
Utilities sector respectively in GICS classification. 
LnA= Natural logarithm of total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
OPG =Yearly growth rate of operating profit during the previous release of financial report of firm 
OP/A =Ratio of operating profit to total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
RE/A =Ratio of retained earning to total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
LL/A= Ratio of long term liability to total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
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Table 3: 
Descriptive statistics for annual shareholders' meetings from 2002-2008 
Panel A: 
By year and all annual shareholders' meetings 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total: 
Cumulative voting meeting 39 38 44 265 64 88 113 651 
No. of Finn 38 38 44 261 64 87 110 642 
Straight Voting Meeting 1001 951 710 767 811 868 925 6033 
No. of Finn 987 938 701 758 777 844 894 5899 
Total Meeting 6684 
Total No. of Firm 6541 
Cumulative Voting Meeting 0.58% 0.57% 0.66% 3.96% 0.96% 1.32% 1.69% 9.74% 
No. of Firm 0.58% 0.58% 0.67% 3.99% 0.98% 1.33% 1.68% 9.82% 
Straight Voting Meeting 14.98% 14.23% 10.62% 11.48% 12.13% 12.99% 13.84% 90.26% 
No. of Firm 15.09% 14.34% 10.72% 11.59% 11.88% 12.90% 13.67% 90.18% 
Total Meeting 100% 
Total No. of Finn 100% 
Panel B: 
By year, the number of finn with first annual shareholders' meeting implementing cumulative voting in election of the board 
ot" directors 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total: 
No. of Firm 37 29 36 208 40 54 53 457 
% of Total: 8.10% 6.350/0 7.88% 45.51% 8.75% 11.82% 11.60% 100.00% 
Table 4: . 
Cumulative abnormal returns for an event study of the information content of implementation of cumulative voting in 
election of board of directors announcements 
Event Window CAR(%) t-value 
(.1,1) 4.5721 3.85 
(-3:3) 4.6616 3.90 
(-5:5) 5.1999 3.87 
(-10:10) 5.3576 M L . 




Abnormal returns for an event study of the information content of implementation of cumulative voting in election of 
board of directors announcements 
Event Day AR(%) t-value CAR(%) t-value 
-3 0.0033 0.03 0.0033 
-2 0.2136 2.03** 0.2168 
-1 -0.0750 -0.64 0.1383 
0 -0.1160 -1.07 -0.1920 
1 4.7631 4.13*** 4.6467 
2 -0.0990 -0.87 4.6636 
3 -0.0270 4.6616 3.90*** 
AR is the sample average abnormal return for the specified day in event time and CAR is the sample average 
cumulative abnormal return for the day -3 to specified day 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 6: 
Descriptive statistics for finn characteristics and mean comparison of CAR between above median/ “ 1" group and 
below median/ “0” group using t-test 
Below median and “0” group Above median and "1" group 
VARIABLES Median Mean Std.Dev Median Mean Std.Dev t-value 
IJhareholder -0.3 3.66 18.96 0.030 5.67 27.64 0.82 
HerftndahlJtoIO -0.16 2.87 19.28 0.020 6.45 27.33 1.45 
Minority Jctiveness -0.24 1.54 18.95 0.31 7.80 27.33 2.62*** 
BHJhare 0 0 4.95 24.37 -0.35 0.13 5.94 -2.01** 
Chairman—CEO 0 0.03 4.75 23.79 -0.93 3.98 23.12 -0.32 
Buy Sell_Assets 0.07 6.32 30.59 -0.25 2.98 13.46 -1.61 
Scandal -2.54 -3.63 3.50 3.57 12.99 31.23 -1.42 
StateJDwned 0 -0.16 7.33 30.54 -0.44 0.14 13.19 0.53 
Domestic 一 Owned 0 0.03 4.39 22.13 -0.39 8.01 36.22 -1.51 
Foreign'Owned 0 -0.14 4.67 23.74 2.65 2.65 7.49 0.51 
Others_Owned 0 -0.18 4.13 22.68 4.26 17.8 40.74 -0.84 
Independent-Director -0.14 2.41 15.99 -0.11 6.91 29.32 5.71*** 
Director__Meeting -0.87 3.78 22.64 0.52 5.54 24.7 1.81* 
Supervise'—Meeting -1.30 2.96 24.68 1.12 6.36 22.56 -0.72 
Non_P OS—Director一 
CommenTs — -2.92 -3.85 3.38 3.57 13.22 31.12 0.36 
Executivejhare -1.03 -1.89 3.73 3.26 11.25 32.03 0.40 
Energy 0 0.020 4.88 24.01 -2 -2.3 4.13 n.a. 
Materials 0 -0.30 2.82 16.76 0.94 13.13 42.02 n.a. 
Industrials 0 0 4.67 24.40 -0.23 4.60 20.82 n.a. 
n 3 
Consumer_ _ ‘ 
Discretionary 0 -0.14 4.33 22.77 -0.08 6.06 27.39 
Consumerjtaples 0 -0.17 4.56 23.32 0.64 5.91 28.22 n.a. 
Health_Care 0 -0.09 5 24.41 -0.14 -0.37 4.66 n.a. 
Financials 0 -0.15 4.79 24.15 0.35 3.03 16.83 n.a. 
IT 0 -0.14 5.09 24.68 -0.03 0.11 5.49 n.a. 
Telecom 0 -0.14 4.66 23.68 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Utilities 0 -0.14 4.68 23.85 -0.25 4.19 20.56 n.a. 
LnA -0.15 6.52 30.05 -0.09 2.78 14.58 -1.51 
OPG -0.30 2.07 14.43 0.22 7.26 30.07 2.15** 
O P / A -0,33 1.21 10.03 0.36 8.12 31.66 2.81*** 
RE/A 0.36 5.58 25.13 -0.19 3.73 22.16 -0.79 
L L / A 0.07 4.86 24.66 -0.21 4.46 22.73 -0.17 
I_Shareholder=PeTcentage of share held by the largest shareholder of firm during the previous release of financial 
report 
Herfindahl_2lo10=A Herfindahl index that measures the concentration of shares held by the top 10 stockholders 
excluding the controlling one of firm during the previous release of financial report. It is computed as sum of square 
of the percentage of share held by the 2nd to 10th largest stockholders 
Minority_Activeness= Percentage of share participated in the previous annua! shareholders' meeting minus percentage 
of share of the top three largest shareholders of firm 
BH_Share= A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm lists as B or H share 
Chairman_CEO= A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman during the annual shareholders 
meeting of firm 
Bi(ySell_Assels= Natural logarithm of the number that firm bought or sold asset successfully as major transaction plus 
1 in previous 3 years 
Scandah Natural logarithm of the number of scandal from stock exchange plus 1 in previous 3 years of firm 
StatejDwned^ A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is state-owned enterprise 
Domestic_Owned=k dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is domestic-owned enterprise 
Foreign J)wned=kdu\x\my variable that equals to 1 firm firm i is foreign investor-owned enterprises 
OthersJbwned^k dummy variable that equals to 丨 if firm is collectively-owned, socially-owned or employee-owned 
enterprise 
Imkpemknt—Director =Ratio of independent director in board of directors of firm 
Director Meeting^' Natural logarithm of the number of board of director meeting plus 1 in previous year of firm 
Supen'isor_Meeting^ Natural logarithm of the number of board of supervisor meeting plus 1 in previous year of firm 
Non_Pos—Birector—Comments二 Natural logarithm of the number of non-positive director comment plus 1 in previous 
3 years of firm 、 
Executive_Share=?Qxccx\Xa%Q of share held by top executives of firm during the previous release of financial report 
Energy, Industriols. Materials, Consumer_Discretionary, ConsumerJStaples. Health一Care, Financials, IT, Telecom, 
Utilities= A dummy variable that equals—to 1 if firm is categorized into Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunication Services and 
Utilities sector respectively in GICS classification. 
LnA= Natural logarithm of total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
OPG =Yearly growth rate of operating profit during the previous release of financial report of firm 
OP/A =Ratio of operating profit to total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
RE/A =Ratio of retained earning to total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
LL/A= Ratio of long term liability to total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
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Table 2: 
OLS regression (i=393) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VARIABLES CAR(%) CAR(%) CAR(%) CAR(%) CAR(%) CAR(%) CAR(%) CAR(%) 
1 -Shareholder 7.98 “ ^ 10.96 7 J 0 
(0.91) (0.93) (1.22) (0.87) 
HerfmdahlJtolO 74.94 69.81 82.58 74.44 
(1.4) (1.3) (1.54) (1.39) 
Minority_Activeness 40.41 42.12 41.28 34.24 
一 （4.07 广 * (4.22)*** (4.16)*** (3.33广 * 
BH—Share -2.92 -2.96 -2.87 -2.95 
— (-0.58) (-0.58) (-0.57) (-0.58) 
Chairman—CEO -1.97 -1.80 -2.44 -2.93 
— (-0.54) (-0.49) (-0.65) (-0.8) 
BuySdl一Assets -2.41 -3.09 
“ (-1.26) (-1.65) 
Scandal 0.89 0.61 
(0.13) (0.09) 
StatejDwned -0.36 2.18 
(-0.02) (0.13) 
Domestic—Owned 1.63 3.11 
— (0.1) (0.18) 
Others—Owned 13.73 17.81 
— (0.76) (0.99) 
Independent— 
Director — 21.61 23.75 18.45 
(2.68 广 * (3.01 r * (2.28)** 
Director Meeting -5.87 -6.76 -3.45 
- (-1.6) (-1.9)* (-0.93) 
Supervisor—Meeting -3.57 -3A7 
一 (-0.94) (-0.92) 
Non—P OS—Director— 
CommenT — -1.10 -1.49 3.23 
(-0.05) (-0.06) (0.13) 
Executive Share 59.47 31.21 
— (1.06) (0.54) 
LnA -1 63 -1.60 -1.82 -1.87 -1.95 -1.18 -1.50 -1.63 
(-1 27) (-1.21) (-1.39) (-1.44) (-1.51) (-0.9) (-1.17〉 (-1.27) 
OPG -0 03 -0 01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 
(-0 25) (-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.24) (-0.26) (-0.43) 
OP/A 19 77 15.82 18.12 19.06 18.74 15.30 18.87 20.14 
(199 广 ( 1 . 5 2 ) ( 1 . 8 i r (1-91)* (1.88)* (1.49) (1.91)* (2.03 广 
R E / A -39 14 -33.95 -34.85 -39.62 -40.03 -36.11 -38.01 -43.52 
(-1 37) (-1.17) (-1.21) (-1.36) (-1.38) (-1.26) (-1.33) (-1.5) 
LL/A 1 15 0.98 1.12 0.39 0.34 1.41 1.401 0.79 
(0.63) (0.53) (0.6) (0.21) (0.18) (0.77) (0.76) (0.43) 
Indusny Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 32.38 40.16 42.06 55.51 53.90 24.96 25.16 40.47 
(1.16) (1.44) (1.3) (1.98)** (1.93)* (0.89) (1.42) 
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 
Adjusted-R-squared 0.0412 0.0033 0.0095 0.0250 0.0252 0.0430 0.0489 0.0487 
t-statistics in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05. *p<0.1 
I_Shareholder=?QxcQx\XsigQ of share held by the largest shareholder of firm during the previous release of financial report 
Herfindohl_2tolO=A Herfindah丨 index that measures the concentration of shares held by the top 10 stockholders excluding the 
controlling-one of firm during the previous release of financial report. It is computed as sum of square of the percentage of share 
held by the 2nd to 10th largest stockholders 
Minority_Activeness= Percentage of share participated in the previous annual shareholders' meeting minus percentage of share of 
the top three largest shareholders of firm 
BH Share二 A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm lists as B or H share —— 
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Chairman JOEO= A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman during the annual shareholders meeting of 
firm 
BuySell_Assets= Natural logarithm of the number that firm bought or sold asset successfully as major transaction plus 1 in 
previous 3 years 
Scandal^ Natural logarithm of the number of scandal from stock exchange plus 1 in previous 3 years of firm 
Stote_Owned= A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is state-owned enterprise 
Domestic_Owmd=k dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is domestic-owned enterprise 
Others jDwned=k dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is collectively-owned, socially-owned or employee-owned enterprise 
Inciependent_Director =Ratio of independent director in board of directors of firm 
Director_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the number of board of director meeting plus 1 in previous year of firm 
Siipervisor_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the number of board of supervisor meeting plus 1 in previous year of firm 
Non_Pos_birector_Comments= Natural logarithm of the number of non-positive director comment plus 1 in previous 3 years of 
firm 
Execulive_Share=Percentage of share held by top executives of firm during the previous release of financial report 
Energy, Materials. Consumer_Discretionary. Consumer—Staples, HealthjOare, Financials, IT, Utilities^ A dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if firm is categorized into Energy, Materials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, 
Information Technology and Utilities sector respectively in GICS classification. 
LnA= Natural logarithm of total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
OPG =Yearly growth rate of operating profit during the previous release of financial report of firm 
OP/A =Ratio of operating profit to total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
RE/A =Ratio of retained earning to total asset during the previous release of financial report of firm 
LL/A= Ratio of long term liability to total asset during the previous release of Financial report of firm 
Table 8: 
First stage Logistic Model 
VARIABLES Cumulative_Voting 
1 —Shareholder 2.13 
(4.45 广 * 
HerfmdahlJtolO -2.8825 
_ (-0.98) 











— -0 .01 




Independent _Director 1.3544 
一 -1.23 




Executive _Share -15.67146 
~ (-1.67) 






t-statistics in parentheses 
***p<0.01，**p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Cumulative_Voting=k dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm implements cumulative voting in election of 
board of directors the first time during the annual shareholders' meeting 
！ —Sfwrelwlcier=Percenlage of share held by the largest shareholder of firm during the previous release of 
financial report 
Heifindahl_2tolO=A Herfmdahl index that measures the concentration of shares held by the top 10 
stockholders excluding the controlling one of firm during the previous release of financial report. It is 
computed as sum of square of the percentage of share held by the 2nd to 10th largest stockholders 
Minority_Activeness= Percentage of share participated in the previous annual shareholders' meeting minus 
percentage of share of the top three largest shareholders of firm during last shareholders meeting 
BH_Share^ A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm lists as B or H share 
Chairman_CEO= A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of firm during the 
annual shareholders meeting 
BuySell_Assets= Natural logarithm of the number that firm bought or sold asset successfully as major 
transaction plus 1 in previous 3 years 
Scandah Natural logarithm of the number of scandal from stock exchange plus 1 in previous 3 years of firm 
State_Owned= A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is state-owned enterprise 
Domestic jDwned^K dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is domestic-owned enterprise 
OthersjDwned^h dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is collectively-owned, socially-owned or 
employee-owned enterprise 
Independent—Director =Ratio of independent director in board of directors of firm 
Director _Meeting^ Natural logarithm of the number of board of directors meeting plus 1 in previous year of 
firm 
Supervisor_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the number of board of supervisor meeting plus 1 in previous 
year of fmn 
Executive _S/?ore=Percentage of share held by top executives of firm during the previous release of financial 
report 
Industry dummies= A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is categorized into Energy, Materials, 
Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, 
Telecommunication Services and Utilities sector respectively in GICS classification. 
Table 9: . 
Top Executives Pay-Performance sensitivities for salary and inside stock ownership 
Panel A: 
Cumulative voting meetings (Treatment Group) 
Before After 
VARIABLES Change Compensation Change Compensation 
Change Shareholder Wealth 0.4327 0.1944 
(3.52)*** (9.16广* 
Constant 0.2832 0.1779 
(8.55 广 * (5.1 r * 
Observations 852 852 
Adjusted-R-squared 0.0132 0.0888 
Panel B; 
Straight voting meetings (Control Group) 
Before After 
VARIABLES Change Compensation Change Compensation 
Change Shareholder Wealth -0.02109 -9.16931 
(-0.03) (-1.34) 
Constant 0.378276 25.76222 
(2.12)** (1.92)* 
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Obset-vations 852 852 
Adjusted-R-squared -0.0012 0.0009 
t-statistics in parentheses 
***p<O.Ql, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Chonge_Compensation=Year\y percentage change of top executives' salary market price of shareholding of firm 
Change_Shareholder_Wealth=Y QQ.r\y percentage change of market capitalization of the Firm 
Table 10: 
Mean comparison between cumulative voting and straight voting group using t-test 
Cumulative Voting Straight Voting 
Treatment Group Control Group t-value 
VARIABLES Before After Difference Before After Difference Difference 
Pay—Performance— 
Sensitivity — -0.0993 0.7086 0.8079 -6.5151 -21.4661 -14.9510 0.95 
Director—Meeting 2.0952 2.2736 0.1784 2.0297 2.2558 0.2261 -2.03** 
Supervisor—Meeting 1.4469 1.6509 0.2040 1.4307 1.6483 0.2176 -0.50 
Non_Pos_Director_ 
Comments ~ 0.0063 0.3608 0.3545 0.0098 0.3818 0.3721 -0.40 
BuySell_Assets 1.1301 1.4427 0.3127 1.1296 1.5531 0.4234 -1.51 
PlaceRightJEquities 0.0061 0.0163 0.0102 0.0040 0.0232 0.0192 -1.58 
Dividend% 0.0106 0.0054 -0.0052 0.0097 0.0054 -0.0043 -1.04 
Scandal 0.01437 0.0069 -0.0075 0.0111 0.0146 0.0034 -1.34 
R O A 0.0281 0.0226 -0.0055 0.0270 0.01477 -0.0123 0.62 
R O E 0.0312 0.0792 0.0480 0.0351 -0.0552 -0.0903 1.70* 
InA 21.0036 21.430 0.4268 21.0347 21.5370 0.5023 -1.52 
OPG -0.3300 1.5731 1.9031 -1.0168 0.8256 1.8424 0.03 
O P / A 0.0300 0.0233 -0.0066 0.0276 0.0180 -0.0096 0.22 
R E / A 0.0502 0.1260 0.0758 0.04505 0.0412 -0.0038 1.23 
L L / A 0.0585 0.0728 0.0143 0.0590 0.0818 0.0229 -1.14 
Tobin ,s q 17.93 23.0370 5.1070 17.4633 19.8981 2.4349 1.06 
Pay_Performance_Sensi(mty=3-year average annual percentage change of top executives' salary market price of 
shareholding to annual percentage change of market capitalization of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years 
(when T=l) 
Director_Meeiing= Natural logarithm of the 3-year average annual number of board of directors of firm i meeting plus 1 in 
previous 3 years(when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
Supervisor_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the 3-year average annual number of board of supervisors meeting of firm i plus 1 
in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
Non_Pos_Director_Comments= Natural logarithm of the 3-year average annual number of non-positive director comment of 
firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
BuySell_Assets= Natural logarithm of the number that firm i bought or sold asset successftjlly as major transaction plus 1 in 
previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
PloceRight_Equities= 3-year average annual percentage of place equities and rights issues of share to total outstanding shares 
of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T= 1) • 
Dividenci%= 3-year average annual percentage of cash dividend yield of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 
years (when T=l) 
Scandah Natural logarithm of the number of scandal from stock exchange plus 1 for firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / 
in next 3 years (when T=l) 
ROA= 3-year average annual ratio of net profit to total asset in previous results announcement of firm i in previous 3 years 
(when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
ROE= 3-year average annual ratio of net profit to total equity in previous results announcement of firm i in previous 3 years 
(when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
LnA= Natural logarithm of 3-year average annual total Asset in previous results announcement of firm i in previous 3 years 
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(when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
OPG = 3-year average annual growth rate of operating profit in annual in previous results announcement of firm i in previous 
3 years (when T二0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
OF//i=3-year average annual ratio of operating profit to total asset in previous results announcement of firm i in previous 3 
years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
RE/A = 3-year average annual ratio of retained earning to total asset in previous results announcement of firm i in previous 3 
years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
LL/A=3-year average annual ratio of long-term liability to total asset in previous results announcement of firm i in previous 3 
years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
Tobin 's q=3-ycar average annual Tobin's q in previous results announcement of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in 
next 3 years (when T=l) 
Table 11: 
Difference in differences regressions (Corporate governance) 
Pay Non_Pos_ 
Perform一ance Director— Supervisor— Director一 BuySell_ PlaceRight一 
VARIABLES Sensitivity Meeting Meeting Comments Assets Equities Dividend。/。 Scandal 
Cumulative _ 
Voting - 6.6814 0.0672 0.0171 -0.0042 0.0135 0.0021 0.000849 0.0038 
(0.57) (3.23)*** (0.79) (-0.14) (0.23) (0.54) (1.21) (0.69) 
T -18.8289 0.2091 0.2031 0.3789 0.3656 0.0163 -0.00512 0.0023 
(-1.59) (9.86)*** (9.24广 * (12.16)*** (6.22)*** (4.08)*** (-7.19广 * (0.4) 
Cumulative_ 
Voting*! - 15 8855 -0.0395 -0.0112 -0.0170 -0.0561 -0.0087 -0.0013 -0.0076 
(0.96) (-1.34) (-0.37) (-0.39) (-0.69) (-1.56) (-1.31) (-0.97) 
InA 9 7305 0.0267 0.0348 -0.0222 0.0615 0.0043 0.002256 -0.0017 
(2.29 广 （3.43 广* (4.32 广 * (-1.95)* (2.85*** (2.96广 (8.63)*** (-0.82〉 
OFG 0 0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 -3.4E-07 0.0000 
(0.53) (0.7) (0.25) (0.2) (0.33) (-0.02) (-0.01) 
O P / A -0 3074 -0.0276 0.0217 -0.9337 0.0210 0.034606 -0.2076 
(-3.51 广 * (-0.3) (0.17) ( - 3 . 8 5 )憎 ( 1 . 2 7 ) ( 1 1 . 7 7广（ - 8 . 8 5 广 
R E / A 2 9638 -0 0664 -0.0147 -0.0101 -0.1800 0.0032 0.0063 -0.0358 
(0.39) (-3.39)-* (-0.73) (-0.35) (-3.32 广 * (0.87) (9.59)*** (-6.82广 
L L / A -43 7048 -0 0012 -0.1691 0.1810 0.0198 0.0353 0.001848 -0.0051 
(-0.90) (-0.01 (-1.87)* (1.41) (0.08) (2.15广 (0.63) (-0.22) 
Comtant -208 7510 1 4804 0.7104 0.4670 -0.1356 -0.0902 -0.03913 0.0548 
(-2.35)- (9.13 产 （ 4 . 2 3 ) * * * (1.96广 （-0.3) (-2.95)*_(-7.18 广 * _ _ ( 1 . 2 6〉 
Observations 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 
Adjusted-R-
squared 0.0035 0.1602 0.1537 0.1974 0.0787 0.0397 0.2429 0.0664 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* * *p<0 .01 , * *p<0 .05 . *p<0.1 
r二 A time dummy variable that equals 1 if it is the time after annual shareholders' meeting for firm . 
Cunmlative_Voting=A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm implements cumulative voting in election of board of directors during 
shareholders' meeting 
Pay_Performance_Sensitivity=3-year average annual percentage change of top executives' salary market price of shareholding to annual 
percentage change of market capitalization of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T= 1) 
Director_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the 3-year average annual number of board of directors of firm meeting plus 1 in previous 3 
years(when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) . . 
Supervisor_Meeting= Natural logarithm of the 3-year average annual number of board of supervisors meeting of firm plus 1 m previous 
3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) . 
Non_Pos_Director_Comments= Natural logarithm of the 3-year average annual number of non-positive director comment of firm in 
previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T= 1) 
BuySell_Assets= Natural logarithm of the number that firm bought or sold asset successfully as major transaction plus 1 in previous 3 
years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
PlaceRight Equities= 3-year average annual percentage of place equities and rights issues of share to total outstanding shares of firm in 
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previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
Dividend%= 3-year average annual percentage of cash dividend yield of firm in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when 
T=l) 
Scandal: Natural logarithm of the number of scandal from stock exchange plus 1 for firm in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 
years (when T=l) 
LnA= Natural logarithm of 3-year average annual total asset in previous results announcement of firm i in previous 3 years (when T=0) / 
in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
OPG - 3-year average annual growth rate of operating profit in annual in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years 
(when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
0F/A^ 7>-yQ<xx average annual ratio of operating profit to total asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years (when 
T=()) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
RE/A = 3-year average annual ratio of retained earning to total asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years (when 
T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
iLL/4=3-year average annual ratio of long-term liability to total asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years (when 
T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
Tobin 's -year average annual Tobin's q in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years 
(when T= 1) 
Table 12: 
DilTercncc in differences regressions (Operating performance) 
VARIABLES ^ InA OP^ O ^ R ^ LL/A 
Cumulative— 
Voting ~ 0.0057 -0.0024 -0.0382 0.7239 0.0037 0.0128 0.0007 
(0.89) (-0.04) (-0.48) (0.54) (0.53) (0.4) (0.11) 
T -0.0040 -0.1125 0.4347 1.2325 -0.0171 -0.0388 0.0070 
(-0.36) (-1.94)* (5.42广* (0.91) (-2.38 广 （-1.2) (0.97) 
Cunmlative— 
Voting*T — 0 0038 0.1379 -0.0605 0.1436 0.0162 0.0882 -0.0050 
(0.25) (1.7)* (-0.54) (0.08) (1.61) (1.97广 （-0.49) 
InA 0 0178 0.0545 1.2151 0.0190 0.0177 0.0291 
(6.03 广 * (2.62 广 * (2.51 r (7.39 广 * (1.5) (11.59广* 
OPG 0.0040 0.0006 0.0000 
(2.23 广 (0.82) (0.12) 
OP/A 2.3875 -3.2145 -0.1162 
(7.29)*** (-34.66)*** (-3.91 广 * 
RE/A -0.0243 0.0333 0.1119 0.1101 -0.1604 -0.0126 
(-4.48)*** (0.89) (1.5) (0.13) (-34.66广 * (-1.89广 
LL/A -0.0843 -0.2203 3.6548 -0.0060 -0.1151 -0.2507 
(-2.45 广 (-0.93) (11.59广* (0) (-3.91 广 * (-1.89)* 
Constant -0.3500 -1.0995 20.7523 -26.5812 -0.3589 -0.2233 -0.5499 
(-5.62r* (-2.52)** (341 j r * (-2.62 广（ - 6 . 6 5 ) * * * (-0.9) (-10.39 广 * 
Ohsen'citions 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 
Adjusted-R-
squcired 0.0512 0.006 0.1993 0.0049 0.547 0.527 0.1145 
t-statistics in parentheses 
***p<0.01,**p<0.05, *p<0.1 -
r=A time dummy variable that equals to 1 if it is the time after annual shareholders' meeting for firm 
Cumulative_Votmg=k dummy variable that equals 1 if firm implements cumulative voting in election of board of directors 
during shareholders' meeting 
ROA= 3-year average annual ratio of net profit to total asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years (when 
T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
ROE= 3-year average annual ratio of net profit to total equity in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years (when 
T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
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LnA= Natural logarithm of 3-year average annual total Asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years (when 
T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
OPG = 3-year average annual growth rate of operating profit in annual in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 
years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
OP/4=3-ycar average annual ratio of operating profit to total asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years 
(when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
RE/A = 3-year average annual ratio of retained earning to total asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years 
(when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
LL/A=3-year average annual ratio of long-term liability to total asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 
years (when 丁=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
Tohin、s <p3-year average annual Tobin's q in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years (when 丁=0) / in next 3 
years (when T二I) 
Table 13: 
Difference in differences regressions (Market firm value) 











O P / A 18.4501 
(4.15)*** 
R E / A 34.4054 
(34.64广 






t-statistics in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
A time dummy variable that equals to 1 if it is the time after annual shareholders' meeting for firm 
Cumulative_Voting=k dummy variable that equals 1 if firm implements cumulative voting in election of board ot 
directors during shareholders' meeting . 
LnA= Natural logarithm of 3-year average annual total Asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 
years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
OPG = 3-year average annual growth rate of operating profit in annual in previous results announcement ot tirm in 
previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) . 
O P / c a r average annual ratio of operating profit to total asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 
years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
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(Control) " ‘ 
RE/A = 3-year average annual ratio of retained earning to total asset in previous results announcement of firm in previous 
3 years (when 丁=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
LL/y4=3-year average annual ratio of long-term liability to total asset in previous results announcement of firm in 
previous 3 years (when T=0) / in next 3 years (when T=l) 
(Control) 
Tobin 's 9=3-year average annual Tobin's q in previous results announcement of firm in previous 3 years (when T=0) / in 
next 3 years (when T=l) 
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Appendix I 
About the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS): 
The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is an industry taxonomy developed by 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), and Standard & Poor's (S&P) for use by the 
global financial community. The GICS structure consists of 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 
68 industries and 154 sub-industries into which S&P has categorized all major public 
companies. GICS is used as a basis for S&P and MSCI financial market indexes. 
Code Sector Subcode Industry Groups 
10 Energy 1010 Energy 
15 Materials 1510 Materials 
20 Industrials 2010 Capital Goods 
2020 Commercial and Professional Services 
2030 Transportation 
25 Consumer Discretionary 2510 Automobiles and Components 
2520 Consumer Durables and Apparel 




30 Consumer Staples 3010 Food and Staples Retailing 
3020 Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
3030 Household and Personal Products 
35 Health Care 3510 Health Care Equipment and Services 
3520 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life 
Sciences 
40 Financials 4010 Banks 
4020 Diversified Financials 
4030 Insurance 
4040 Real Estate 
45 Information Technology 4510 Software and Services 
4520 Technology Hardware and Equipment 
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4530 Semiconductors and Semiconductor 
Equipment 
50 Telecommunication 5010 Telecommunication Services 
Services 




Cumulative voting announcement of Changyuan Group Ltd. listed in the Shanghai Stock 








We translated the Chinese document into English as follows: 
Changyuan Group Ltd.: Amendment of articles of association 
Section 84 of the article states, ‘‘Decisions are made by name recorded voting in 
shareholders' meetings." 
Add "The company uses cumulative voting system in electing directors. The term 
"cumulative voting system," as mentioned, refers to a system of voting by shareholders for 
the election of directors during the shareholders' meeting, in which the shareholder can 
multiply his voting rights by the number of candidates. Shareholders can use all votes to 





Implementation of cumulative voting in the election of board of directors during the 
shareholders' meeting for Changyuan Group Ltd. listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange 









We translated the Chinese document to English as follows: 
2. Situation of proposals deliberation 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange audits the qualifications and independency of all 
independent director candidates. No objection is proposed. Shareholders attending this 
temporary shareholders' meeting deliberate over the proposals seriously, using cumulative 
voting system. Mr. Chengyu Gang, who obtained 72,915,995 votes, passed the proposal of 
independent director appointment. 
f 
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